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R.BAr. PROPERTY-VENDOR AND PtmCHASER-EFFECT OF NoTomous EAsEON LAND CoNTRAC'l' TO CoNVEY "FREE OF ENcuMBRANCEs"-Vendor
contracted to convey land to purchaser by a deed which was to contain a covenant against encumbrances. A public easement of way over the property
was outstanding, and on part of this easement a gravel road had been built.
Purchaser paid some instalments and took possession but, upon learning of
the easement, sued to rescind. The trial court found that the easement would
have been discovered by a reasonable investigation, and therefore the contract
did not protect purchaser from this easement. On appeal, held, affirmed. A
contract to convey real estate free of encumbrances does not refer to easements,
permanent in character, which are either known or should have been discovered by the purchaser. Somers v. Leiser, (Wash. 1953) 259 P. (2d) 843.
The law is extremely confused as to the interpretation to be given a contract calling for title free of encumbrances. However, the provision for conveyance "free from encumbrances" rarely is held to include all easements. One
of the determinants for excluding an easement from the aegis of the provision
is that the easement is known to the purchaser or would be revealed by a
reasonable inspection of the premises. 1 Knowledge or imputed knowledge is
interconnected with other factors in almost every jurisdiction, however, so
that a general rule is difficult to draw. At least one 'jurisdiction holds that
where the contract specifically provides for a deed with a covenant against
encumbrances, knowledge of existing easements is immaterial, but where the
contract merely calls for a marketable title, or a good and sufficient deed,
knowledge or imputed knowledge bars the purchaser from rescinding the
contract.2 Other courts rule in accordance with the principal case that regardless of the provision for a covenant against encumbrances, an easement
which is open and notorious is impliedly excepted from the covenant.3 The
rescission action should be compared with a suit on the covenant itself after
the deed has been executed. A similar dichotomy of opinion is found in this
situation, but more jurisdictions, including Washington, hold the knowledge
of the covenantee inadmissible on the basis that it violates the parol evidence
rule.4 Also to be taken into account is the type of easement. Some courts
hold public easements not to be encumbrances at all because they benefit as
MENr

See generally 55 AM. Jun. 710 (1946); 57 A.L.R. 1426-1428 (1928).
Strong v. Brinton, 63 Pa. Super. 267 (1916); Patterson v. Freihofer, 215 Pa. 47,
64 A. 326 (1906). A public easement, however, is simply held not to be an encumbrance
in Pennsylvania.
3 McCarty v. Wilson, 184 Cal. 194, 193 P. 578 (1920); Suter v. Mason, 147 Ark.
505, 227
782 (1921).
4 McDonald v. Ward, 99 Wash. 354, 169 P. 851 (1918). Two leading cases in
this area are Huyck v. Andrews, 113 N.Y. 81, 20 N.E. 581 (1889) (holding knowledge
inadmissible) and Kutz v. McCune, 22 Wis. 628 (1868) (contra). Those courts holding
knowledge to be immaterial argue that titles would be uncertain jf the rule were otherwise. Those courts holding otherwise reason that a spate of litigation would ensue because of the numerous obvious easements which are not included in deeds.
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well as burden the land.I• Other courts exclude public easements because of
a presumption of knowledge by the purchaser. Evidently this presumption
may be rebutted. 6 Where the easement deprives the purchaser of no substantial rights in the land, the de minimis doctrine has been held to except
the easement from a contract to convey, regardless of knowledge. 7
The importan.ce to be attached to the notoriety of the easement is purportedly determined by construing the land contract.8 In conformance with
this theory, peculiar circumstances have been held to give effect to the covenant as written.9 Undoubtedly, therefore, the purchaser could with apt words
indemnify himself against all easements of whatever character. Even with the
contract provision used in the principal case, the only hardship comes when
the purchaser is charged with knowledge of the easement but has not actually
discovered it. In these cases, the rule of the Washington court seems to place
a duty on the purchaser to inspect the premises and perhaps some public
records which he probably thinks that he has safely contracted against.
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5 Jordan v. Eve, 31 Gratt. (Va.) 1 (1878). In a leading case, the Minnesota court
excepted only rural public highways on the grounds that custom dictated this result.
Sandum v. Johnson, 122 Minn. 368, 142 N.W. 878 (1913).
6 Although it is rare when a public easement is not or should not be known by the
purchaser to exist, one case has held that where no knowledge of the easement existed,
the purchaser could recover on the contract. McWhorter v. Forney Bros. & Co., 69 Wash.
414, 125 P. 164 (1912). Compare Bibber v. Weber, 102 N.Y.S. (2d) 945 at 949
(1951): "Where the highway was open and visible, the grantee either knew or was
presumed to know of its existence."
7Monogram Development Co. v. Natben Construction Co., 253 N.Y. 320, 171 N.E.
390 (1930).
8 E.g., Eriksen v. Whitescarver, 57 Colo. 409 at 411, 142 P. 413 (1914): "The
mere fact that defendant may have known of the existence of the ditch, at the time she
signed the contract did not relieve the plaintiff from complying with her covenant respecting the character of the title she agreed to convey. To produce such result there
must, in addition to notice, have been at least something in the transaction to show that
the parties intended the incumbrance should be excluded from the operation of this
covenant." For the opposing view, see Suter v. Mason, 147 Ark. 505 at 510, 227 S.W.
782 (1921): "He [the purchaser] purchased the property in contemplation of its physical
condition and with reference thereto. Therefore, • • • [the purchaser] can not rely upon
the existence of the road and right-of-way across the land as matters calling for a rescission
of the contract."
9 In Eriksen v. Whitescarver, note 8 supra, a finding that the use to which the purchaser planned to put the property was rendered impossible by the easement helped show
that regardless of knowledge of the easement the purchaser could rescind.

